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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE BOYER COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, and H. ROGER 
BOYER dba THE BOYER COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
vs. Case N9. 14442 
E. KEITH LIGNELL and 
BURTON M. TODD, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiffs to recover from 
defendants a commission for broker's services rendered by plain-
tiffs pursuant to two agreements by the terms of which defen-
dants retained plaintiffs to market certain realty. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Following a trial of the case, the lower court entered 
judgment against plaintiffs and awarded to defendants their 
costs and certain discovery expenses. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
By this appeal, plaintiffs-appellants seek a reversal 
of the lower court's judgment and an order directing the lower 
court to enter judgment in favor of plaintiffs-appellants in 
the amount of $28,500.00, together with their costs incurred 
below, their costs incurred on appeal, and the amounts hereto-
fore paid by them to defendants-respondents for costs and dis-
covery expenses pursuant to the judgment of the lower court. 
^ STATEMENT OF FACTS : 
Point III, which is the core of this appeal, presents 
the issue whether the lower court's finding that defendants 
did not fail or refuse to cooperate with plaintiffs towards 
the consummation of the sale of the subject realty is clearly 
against the weight of the evidence. Due to the nature of 
Point III and because the finding of the lower court to that 
effect is stated only as a conclusion and without any arti-
culated factual basis (Finding No.6, R.194), a relatively de-
tailed statement o'f facts is required. 
Plaintiff H. Roger Boyer ("Boyer") is a Utah resident 
who, since 1972 has been duly licensed by the Real Estate Divi-
sion of Utah Department of Business Regulation as a real es-
tate broker. (Finding No.3, R.194). The Boyer Company, a 
Utah corporation, was incorporated on November 8, 1972, and 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
since that time has remained in good standing. (Finding No. 1, 
R.193). Boyer, since the inception of The Boyer Company, has 
been its president and sole stockholder. (T.168-69). Although 
the lower court concluded that The Boyer Company was not pro-
perly licensed as a real estate broker (R.186-87), the Director 
of the Real Estate Division of Utah testified without contra-
diction and the lower court tacitly recognized (R.186-87) that 
The Boyer Company was duly licensed as a broker pursuant to the 
prevailing and long-established practices of the Real Estate 
Division. (R.186-87, T.287-88, 299). 
Burton M. Todd ("Todd") and E. Keith Lignell ("Lignell") 
are both dentists who, in addition to their dental practice, 
engage in extensive realty investment and development together. 
(T.12-13). At all times material to this action, Todd and Lig-
nell were the owners of the Shaughnessy Apartments, a commer-
cial apartment facility located at 251 South 700 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. (R.14). Todd and Lignell, because of their need 
for cash in the approximate amount of $250,000.00, decided to 
sell the Shaughnessy Apartments in late September of 1973, (T. 
24, 258-59, Todd Depo. p.46). 
On October 1, 1973, Todd and Lignell entered into a list-
ing agreement (the "Listing Agreement11) with Boyer authorizing 
Boyer to procure a sale of the Shaughnessy Apartments for the 
sum of $950,000.00. (T.14-15, Exhibit 1-P) For the convenience 
of the Court, a copy of the Listing Agreement is included 
-^-
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following the main body of this brief as Exhibit "A." The 
Listing Agreement rendered any sale of the apartments subject 
to the approval of the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany ("Northwestern"), the holder of a mortgage upon the pro-
perty, and contemplated that any purchaser would assume that 
mortgage and pay to Todd and Lignell the difference between 
the mortgage balance and the sales price. Finally, the List-
ing Agreement provided that Boyer was entitled to a commission 
of six percent of the sales price (amounting to $57,000.00) 
upon completion of the sale and payment by the buyers of the 
difference between the mortgage balance and the sales price. 
(Finding No.4, R.194, Exhibit "A" hereto). 
The Osmond Brothers is a singing group of national re-
pute consisting of various children of Mr. and Mrs. George V. 
Osmond, longtime residents of the State of Utah. The Osmond 
Brothers, a Utah partnership (the "Osmond Brothers") is a ve-
hicle through which the Osmond family has conducted its invest-
ment activities. Since early 1972, Douglas L. Callister 
("Callister"), a California attorney, and Lew Costley ("Cost-
ley"), an Ogden, Utah accountant, have as a practical matter 
managed the business affairs of the Osmond Brothers with only 
slight involvement of the general partners of the Osmond Bro-
thers. (T.93-97, 113-16, Callister Depo. pp.28-32). 
Between October 1, 1973 and October 11, 1973, Boyer dis-
cussed with Callister and Costley the possibility of the 
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Osmond Brothers purchasing the Shaughnessy Apartments, which 
discussions culminated in Boyer's preparation of an Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, which was executed by 
Costley on behalf of the Osmond Brothers on October 11, 1973. 
(T.116-18, 132, Callister Depo. pp.8-17). A copy of that 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase (the "Earnest Money 
Agreement") in its executed final form is for the convenience 
of the Court included herein following the body of this brief, 
as Exhibit "B." The Earnest Money Agreement, as executed by 
Costley, was conditioned upon the buyer's ability to assume 
Northwestern1s mortgage bearing interest at seven percent per 
annum and the seller's agreement to lease the property back 
from the buyers for a period of three years. (Finding No.7, R. 
194-95, Exhibit 2-P, Exhibit "B" hereto). The Earnest Money 
Agreement contained an offer to purchase the Shaughnessy Apart-
ments for $921,500.00, with a commission in the amount of 
$28,500.00 payable to The Boyer Company as broker. Boyer had 
theretofore agreed with George V. Osmond, who is also a licen-
sed real estate broker, evenly to divide the commission from 
the sale, each party to receive $28,500.00. (T.98-99, Callis-
ter Depo. p.18). Accordingly, the Earnest Money Agreement, 
like the Listing Agreement, prescribed that Todd and Lignell 
would receive a net sum after the deduction of all brokers' 
commissions, of $921,500.00. Concurrently with their execu-
tion of the Earnest Money Agreement, the Osmond Brothers 
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deposited with Boyer earnest money in the amount of $5,000.00. 
(T.111-12, Exhibit 4-P). On October 11, 1973, Boyer delivered 
to Todd the Earnest Money Agreement. '(T.18-19). 
On October 11, 1973, Todd and Lignell discussed the 
Earnest Money Agreement and Todd, in anticipation of certain 
changes to the Agreement and his expected departure from Salt 
Lake City, executed the document and placed his initials in 
the lower right hand corner of the document. (Finding No.8, 
R.195, T.66). On October 12, 1973, Lignell for both himself 
and Todd and in the presence of Boyer deleted that portion of 
the Earnest Money Agreement relating to a lease back of the 
property by the sellers, initialled the deletion, signed the 
document, and delivered same to Boyer. (Finding No.9, R.195). 
Boyer then returned to his office with the Earnest Money 
Agreement and telephoned Callister. After Boyer advised Callis-
ter of the changes made to the Earnest Money Agreement by Todd 
and Lignell, Callister on behalf of the Osmond Brothers autho-
rized Boyer to enter into and close the agreement as modified 
by Todd and LigneU. (T. 183-84, Callister Depo. pp. 19-22). 
Within a day or two following Todd and Lignell1s execution and 
modification of the Earnest Money Agreement, Boyer delivered 
the modified document to Costley. Shortly thereafter, Costley 
telephoned Callister and in that conversation the two decided 
that the Osmond Brothers would agree to enter into the Earnest 
Money Agreement as modified. (T.118-21). On October 15, 1973, 
-6-
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Boyer telephoned Todd and advised him that the Osmond Brothers 
had accepted the Earnest Money Agreement as modified by Todd 
and Lignell and desired to effect a closing as soon as possible, 
(T.184-85). Todd denied that Boyer advised him of the Osmond 
Brothers1 acceptance of the modified Earnest Money Agreement, 
but testified that Boyer had told him that "it could be worked 
out." (T.21-23), 
Following October 12, 1973, Boyer, Callister, Costley, 
and the Osmond Brothers believed that a contract had been en-
tered into between the Osmond Brothers and Todd and Lignell 
represented by the Earnest Money Agreement as modified by Todd 
and Lignell. (Callister Depo. pp.21-27, T.120-24). Thus, 
between October 12, and 15, 1973, Boyer discussed with Costley 
the course that the Osmond Brothers should pursue in disposing 
of certain liquid assets to procure the down payment prescribed 
by the Earnest Money Agreement, and Boyer, on October 15, 1973, 
requested and one day later obtained from Title Insurance Agency 
an Interim Title Insurance Binder with respect to the Shaugh-
nessy Apartments. (T.185-186; Exhibit 9-P). 
On October 15, 1973, Boyer telephoned Todd to discuss 
the closing of the sale of the Shaughnessy Apartments and Todd 
agreed to contact Northwestern regarding the arrangement of 
the Osmond Brothers' assumption of the Northwestern loan (T.26-
27, 184-85). Theodore C. MacLeod ("MacLeod"), a resident of 
Denver, Colorado, is the Regional Manager of Northwestern 
-7-
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and is charged with the responsibility of originating and 
administrating Northwestern1s loans in Utah, among other 
states. (T.195-96, MacLeod Depo. pp.2-3). Following his 
conversation with Boyer, Todd telephoned MacLeod and discussed 
in a general way the possible sale of the Shaughnessy Apart-
ments to the Osmond Brothers, and the alternative approaches 
available to effectuate an assumption of the loan by the Os-
mond Brothers in such a transaction. (MacLeod Depo. pp.34-36, 
56, T.26-28, 47-48). MacLeod left the conversation ,fwith the 
ball in [Todd's] court," and with MacLeod expecting Todd to 
return with a concrete proposal (MacLeod Depo. p.33). Todd, 
however, testified that in this conversation, MacLeod indicated 
that Northwestern would not permit the Osmond Brothers to as-
sume the loan absent an increase in the interest rate thereof 
above seven percent. (T.27). 
On October 26, 1973, Todd, Lignell, Boyer, and Earl D. 
Tanner met for lunch and discussed in the framework of MacLeod's 
comments the method by which an assumption of the Northwestern 
loan could be arranged. (T.189). During that conversation, 
Todd or Lignell indicated that Northwestern may require some 
additional incentive to consent to the assumption of the loan 
by the Osmond Brothers. (T.190). On October 29, 1973, Boyer 
telephoned Todd, and, during that conversation, Todd indicated 
-8-
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that he and Lignell were less excited about closing the sale 
because of a possible tax consequence of approximately $145, 
000.00, (T.160-62, 191-92, Exhibit 10-P), Todd, while acknow-
ledging that he advised Boyer of that tax consequence,indicated 
that the tax problem did not materialize and played no role in 
his decision to terminate the transaction. (Tt160). 
On October 30, 1973, Boyer, Callister and Costley met 
and discussed the incentives that the Osmond Brothers would be 
willing to give to induce Northwestern to allow assumption, 
including prepayment of the 1974 interest on the Northwestern 
loan, an increased rate of interest on a larger loan, and the 
like. Boyer relayed these potential incentives to Todd. (T. 
137-38, 194-95). 
On November 2, 1973, Boyer telephoned MacLeod to deter-
mine the status of the proposed assumption. MacLeod refused 
to discuss this matter in any detail with Boyer, advising Boyer 
that any such inquiry must come from Todd. (T.196-97 and Mac-
Leod Depo. p.8). MacLeod1s understanding and practice in im-
plementing the policies of Northwestern were neither to dis-
cuss nor consider any modification of financing arrangements 
with their borrowers absent authorization from their borrower, 
with whom they have privity. Boyer then telephoned Todd and 
inquired why no formal request had been directed to Northwestern 
to permit assumption. Todd promised to make such written re-
quest that day and to provide Boyer with a copy of the letter. 
-Q-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(T.50-51, 197-98). On November 7, 1973, Boyer asked Todd why 
he had not yet received a copy of Todd's promised letter to 
MacLeod, and Todd responded that he was awaiting MacLeod's 
call concerning a possible refinancing of the Shaughnessy 
Apartments and that Todd and Lignell were considering selling 
another property to satisfy their cash requirements. (T.152, 
198-99, 259-61). Todd never sent the letter that he had pro-
mised to send to MacLeod (T.50-51). On November 11, 1973, Boyer 
again telephoned MacLeod to determine the status of assumption 
negotiations. MacLeod'advised Boyer that Todd was aware of 
Northwestern's position and that Boyer should direct his inquiry 
to Todd. (MacLeod Depo. pp.36-37, 59-60). On November 16, 
1973, Todd told Boyer that he and Lignell would not proceed 
with a sale of the Shaughnessy Apartments. (T.29). Boyer re-
quested a letter to that effect from Todd which Todd prepared 
on November 19, 1973, a copy of which is attached hereto for 
the Court's convenience following the main body of this brief 
as Exhibit "C." (T.29, Exhibit 5-P). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING WITHOUT MODIFICATION 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT PREPARED BY COUNSEL FOR 
DEFENDANTS AND, AT BEST, SUCH FINDINGS ARE EN-
TITLED TO LITTLE WEIGHT. 
The lower court conducted the trial of this case between 
-10-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
September 22 and 25, 1975. On September 29, 1975, the lower 
court entered its Memorandum Decision, which enunciated the 
bases for its decision. (R.186-87). Approximately one month 
thereafter, counsel for defendants submitted to the lower court 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which were signed and 
entered by the lower court without modification. (R.193-97). 
Plaintiffs timely moved the lower court pursuant to Rule 52(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law theretofore entered by the lower court (R. 
200-05), which motion was denied in its entirety by the lower 
court. (R.215-16). • ,. . 
This Court has long maintained that ff[tjhe duty of mak-
ing findings and conclusions is that of the trial court.ff 
Merrill v. Bailey & Sons, 99 Utah 323, 106 P. 2d 255 (1940). In-
deed, that duty is expressly and absolutely imposed upon the 
trial court by Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately 
its conclusions of law thereon. ] \ . 
This Court has not yet spoken to the legal effect of a 
trial court's mechanical adoption of the findings and conclusions 
of counsel. Other courts, however, have with good reason con-
demned the practice: 
[A]ppellant?s objections were made . . . to 
. . . proposed findings with which the find-
ings of the district court are apparently 
identical. We have recently asked for 
-11-
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ITbrief and pertinent findings of contested 
matters * * * rather than the delayed, ar-
gumentative, overdetailed documents pre-
pared by winning counsel." [Citations 
omitted]. Otherwise, we lose the benefit 
of the judge's own consideration. . . , 
We stress this matter because of the 
grave importance of fact-finding. The cor-
rect finding, as near as may be, of the 
facts of a law suit is fully as important 
as the application of the correct legal 
rules to the facts found. An impeccably 
lfrightff legal rule applied to the "wrong" 
facts yields a decision which is as faulty 
as one which results from the application 
of the "wrong" legal rule to the "right" 
facts. The latter type of error, indeed, 
can be corrected on appeal. But the former 
• is not subject to such correction unless 
the appellant overcomes the heavy burden 
of showing that the findings of fact are 
"clearly erroneous". . . . 
The trial court is the most important 
agency of the judicial branch of the govern-
ment precisely because on it rests the re-
sponsibility of ascertaining the facts. 
When a federal trial judge sits without a 
jury, that responsibility is his. And it 
is not a light responsibility; unless his 
findings are "clearly erroneous", no upper 
court may disturb them. To ascertain the 
facts is not a mechanical act. It is a dif-
ficult artv not a science. It involves 
skill and judgment. As fact-finding is a 
human undertaking, it can, of course, never 
be perfect and infallible. For that reason 
every effort should be made to render it 
as adequate as it humanly can be. United 
States v. Forness, 125 F.2d 928, 942^T3 
X2d Cir.), cert, denied, 316 U.S. 694 (1942). 
[Footnotes omitted]. 
Other courts have similarly discouraged trial courts1 adoption 
without modification of findings and conclusions submitted by 
1 O 
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counsel for the prevailing party. Phillips v. Phillips, 171 
Colo. 127, 464 P.2d 876 (1970). (Because of the lower court's 
mechanical adoption of counsel's findings, n[w]e stretch nearly 
to the breaking point the presumption that the findings entered 
by the court were in fact the court's own findings"); Puffin v. 
Patrick, 212 Kans. 772, 512 P.2d 442 (1973). 
In this case, the findings prepared by defendants' coun-
sel, quite predictably, substantially embellished the lower 
court's Memorandum Decision. Certainly the trial court could 
not have agreed with each and every one of defendants' findings. 
The effect is that plaintiffs, and indeed this Court, must 
speculate as to whether the findings which are challenged through 
this appeal are those of the lower court or of defendants, while 
defendants can steadfastly urge that the same are those of the 
lower court and entitled to a presumption of propriety. 
The lower court's findings come to this court endowed 
with a strong presumption of propriety, requiring a showing that 
the same are clearly erroneous for reversal. Hardy v. Hendrick-
son, 27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28 (1972). That presumption should 
1,1
 " V 
not properly attach to the findings of counsel, which are those-
of an advocate and deprive this Court of the benefit of the 
lower court's thoughtful reasoning and judgment. Plaintiffs' 
concern in this respect is one of substance, for the lower court 
in its Memorandum Decision made no mention of whether defendants 
cooperated or refused to proceed in connection with the subject 
_1 Q_ 
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transaction -- the central issue of this appeal. Counselfs 
findings, however, with no supportive factual determination, 
baldly state that defendants did not fail or refuse to cooper-
ate or proceed with the transaction. 
Plaintiffs desire at this juncture to make absolutely 
clear that no suggestion is made that counsel for defendants, 
who are capable, honest, and ethical attorneys for whom we 
have great regard and respect, have in the slightest acted im-
properly. Indeed, defendants' counsel in submitting their find-
ings and conclusions merely discharged their duty as advocates. 
Both on behalf of plaintiffs and as lawyers practicing law in 
the State of Utah, however, we seek to make this appeal and 
those that will follow the Court's decision in this case more 
meaningful by ensuring that the findings that reach this Court 
are those of the trial court, and not of counsel. For the 
foregoing reasons, this case should be remanded for proper find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law by the lower court; in any 
event, the findings of fact herein should not be accorded the 
usual presumption^of validity in this appeal. 
POINT II 
THE BOYER COMPANY WAS DULY LICENSED AS A REAL 
ESTATE BROKER. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the lower court held: 
[t]hat the corporation cannot recover because 
-14-
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said corporation was not licensed as is re-
quired by Section 61-2-1, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as amended, and particularly 
is this so under 61-2-18. 
The Court is not unmindful of the 
Utah Supreme Court decision in 29 Utah 2d,, 
at page 110, State Board of Education vs. 
State Board of Higher Education wherein 
the Court held that long interpretations 
by administrative bodies can be accepted, 
in effect, as proper even though techni-
cally they are not legal. At least that 
is the interpretation this Court gets from 
a reading of that case. 
It appeared from the evidence that 
it has long been the practice of the Real 
Estate Division of the Department of Busi-
ness Regulation not to license corpora-
tions as brokers. However, the law is 
clear and unequivocal, and the Court is 
of the opinion that the corporation is 
barred from recovery. (R.186-87). 
Thus, while the lower court at least implicitly recognized that 
The Boyer Company had been licensed in accordance with well-
established and long standing practices of the Real Estate Divi-
sion, the lower court concluded, we believe erroneously, that 
The Boyer Company was not licensed as a broker within the meaning 
of the applicable statutes. 
Section 61-2-18, Utah Code Annotated (Repl.1968) in sub-
stance prohibits any suit by any person, partnership, associa-
tion, or corporation for recovery of a fee for services in 
1/ Not surprisingly, the Findings of Fact prepared by counsel 
For defendants do not include the lower court's factual finding 
that it has long been the practice of the Real Estate Division 
not to license corporations as brokers. 
-1 S-
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connection with sales of realty unless such person is so licensed 
as a broker at the time of such act. It is undisputed that un-
less The Boyer Company was licensed as a real estate broker dur-
ing October and November, 1973, The Boyer Company cannot main-
tain this action. The issue presented by Point II is whether 
The Boyer Company was so licensed. 
The uncontroverted testimonial evidence offered at trial 
by Stephen J. Francis, Director of the Real Estate Division of 
the Utah Department of Business Regulation (the "Division") was 
to the effect that the Division does hot and will hot license 
corporations as such, but rather licenses as brokers only natural 
persons. (T.272-75). According to Mr. Francis, any entity other 
than a natural person becomes duly qualified to act as a broker 
only when a natural person duly licensed as a broker becomes as-
sociated with the entity. (T.272-75). Following the Division's 
approval of the association between a licensed individual and 
the brokerage corporation, both the corporation in its name and 
the associated individual in his name may properly act as bro-
kers. (T.279-82, .299). Mr. Francis testified, and the lower 
court in its Memorandum Decision found, that the foregoing has 
long been and is now the practice of the Division. (R.187, T. 
284-85). 
The Findings of Fact herein reflect that Boyer, an indi-
vidual, at all times relevant to this case was the holder of a 
valid real estate broker's license. (Finding No.3, R.194) . 
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Boyer applied for a license as broker on behalf of The Boyer Com-
pany. (Exhibit 8-P). The Division duly granted to Boyer and 
The Boyer Company a broker's license in the name of "H. Roger 
Boyer dba The Boyer Company.11 (Exhibit 8-P), Mr, Francis 
testified that, according to the practices of the Division, The 
Boyer Company thereupon became a qualified real estate broker, 
and that thereafter both Boyer and The Boyer Company could pro-
perly act as real estate brokers. (T,287-88, 299). 
In the face of the foregoing uncontroverted testimony, 
the lower court concluded that The Boyer Company was not licensed 
as required by Title 61, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated (Repl. 
1968). That chapter clearly contemplates that corporations may 
obtain brokers' licenses, but is at best ambiguous as to the 
procedure for such licensing of corporate brokers. The only pro-
vision contained in that chapter governing the application for 
or receipt of brokers' licenses by corporations provides as 
follows: 
(c) Each real estate broker's license 
granted to any firm, partnership, or associa-
tion consisting of more than one person, or 
to a corporation, shall entitle such real es-
tate broker to designate one of its officers 
or members, who upon compliance with the terms 
of this chapter shall, without the payment of 
any further fee, upon issuance of said bro-
ker's license, be entitled to perform all of 
the acts of a real estate salesman contemplated 
by this chapter. The person so designated, 
however, must make application for a sales-
man's license, accompanying the application of 
the real estate broker. If in any case the 
-17-
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person so designated by a real estate broker 
shall be refused a license by the commission, 
or in case such person ceases to be connected 
with such real estate broker, the broker shall 
have the right to designate another person, 
who shall make application as in the first in-
stance. Utah Code Annotated § 61-2-9(c) (Repl. 
1968), 
The statute just quoted, it will be noted, does not prescribe 
the method by which a corporation may obtain a broker's license 
or the form to be taken by a corporate broker's license. 
The statutory requirements governing all "applicants'1 
for brokers1 licenses, however, cast light upon the probable 
scheme contemplated by the Legislature in enacting the above-
quoted section: 
[T]he board of real estate examiners may re-
quire and pass upon such proof as may be 
deemed necessary to determine the honesty, 
integrity, truthfulness, reputation, and com-
petency of each applicant; and shall require 
the applicant to pass an examination, and pre-
scribe the passing grade. . . . Three years' 
full time experience as a real estate sales-
man or its equivalent shall be necessary be-
fore any applicant may apply for, and secure 
a broker's license in the state of Utah. 
•'* * * Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-6(a) (Repl. 
1968) (Emphasis added). 
V 
Section 61-2-6(b) further requires that any applicant for a 
broker's license shall furnish information concerning previous 
and present residences, recommendations of individuals who are 
acquainted with the applicant, and the like. Based upon the 
mandatory statutory requirements identified above, no corpora-
tion can ever properly be an "applicant" for a broker's license, 
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since corporations cannot accomplish such uniquely human things 
as take examinations, be honest, competent, or truthful, pos-
sess experience, or develop acquaintances. It follows ines-
capably that although corporations may by statute be licensed 
as brokers, only individuals may be "applicants11 for such li-
censes. The issue, therefore, is whether the Divisionfs in-
terpretation and implementation of the licensing of corporate 
brokers precludes the recovery of The Boyer Company, 
In its Memorandum Decision, the lower court correctly 
recognized that Mlong interpretations of administrative bodies 
can be accepted, in effect, as proper even though they are tech-
nically incorrect." (R.187). In Colmari v. Utah State Land 
Board, 17 Utah 2d. 14, 403 P.2d 781 (1965), this Court addressed 
the issue whether the State Land Board was required by law to 
accept the first bidder offering to lease oil and gas lands 
or whether the Board could properly seek competitive bidding. 
In resolving that question of statutory construction, the Court 
strongly presumed the propriety of and adopted the statutory 
interpretation of thevState Land Board: 
From the dispute that has arisen over 
the situation at hand, it is obvious that 
our statutes leave something to be desired 
as to certainty. Where such uncertainty 
exists the interpretation and application 
of statutes adopted by the administrative 
agency is usually looked upon with some in-
dulgence. It is both just and practical 
that the Board should be allowed consider-
able latitude of discretion in deciding 
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what policies will best carry out the respon-
sibilities imposed upon it. Due to the con-
siderations just stated, and because of its 
experience and presumed expert knowledge in 
its field, an administrative interpretation 
and application of a statute, although not 
necessarily controlling, is generally regarded 
as prima facie correct and not to be over-
turned so long as it is in conformity with 
the general objectives the agency is charged 
with carrying out, and there is a rational 
basis for it in the provisions of law, 17 
Utah 2d at 19, 403 P,2d at 784. (Citations 
omitted). 
This Court, employing like reasoning, reached the same result 
in State v. Hatch, 9 Utah 2d 288, 342 P.2d 1103 (1959). 
"
r
~-~"
a
*"~'""-*. The^ isrsue here presented to the Court is virtually iden-
tical to that present in the Colman case. As noted above, the 
governing statutes here, like those in Colman, are ambiguous. 
The Division here, like the Board in Colman, is vested with sub-
stantial discretion in discharging its responsibilities and 
is presumed to possess expert knowledge in its field. E.g., 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-2-5,-6 (Repl.1968). Thus, the interpreta-
tion of the Division is to be "regarded as prima facie correct 
and not to be overturned so long as it is in conformity with the 
general objectives the agency is charged with carrying out, and 
there is a rational basis for it in the provisions of law.11 
Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 17 Utah 2d 14, 19, 403 P.2d 781, 
784 (1965). It remains to determine whether the Division1s in-
terpretation is in conformity with the objectives of Title 61, 
Chapter 2 and whether that interpretation has a rational basis 
in law. 
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The objects of the statutory scheme concerning brokers 
are apparent both from this Court's pronouncements and from the 
language of the legislation itself. In Seal v. Powell, 9 Utah 
2d 372, 345 P.2d 432 (1959), the Court observed: 
[T]he real purpose of the real estate 
broker's legislation . . , quite clearly 
looks to the protection of the public 
from dishonest or unscrupulous persons 
whose business is dealing in transactions 
whose objects are the consummation of 
real estate deals. 9 Utah 2d at 374, 
345 P.2d at 433. 
Again, in Andersen v. Johnson, 108 Utah 417, 421, 160 P.2d 725, 
727 (1945), the Court observed that the purpose of the broker 
licensing statutes was "to provide for registration and regula-
tion of those engaged in the real estate business" and "to re-
quire real estate brokers and salesmen to be 'honest, truthful 
and of good reputation.'" 
Consistent with the purpose of the broker licensing leg-
islation, the Division licenses individuals who, unlike corpora-
tions, can ensure that their real estate activities and those of 
entities with which they are affiliated are discharged compe-
tently, scrupulously," and honestly. Only through association 
with such a person can a corporation properly act as a broker. 
By looking to some responsible individual, as Mr. Francis ob-
served, the Division can address and presumably correct problems 
encountered by others with that broker organization. (T.266). 
Thus, the Division's interpretation of the broker legislation 
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is consistent with and reasonably designed to effectuate the 
purposes and policies of that legislation. 
Further, the Division's interpretation has a sound sta-
sutory basis. As noted above, only natural persons can be 
"applicants11 • for broker's licenses by the very terms of the sta-
tute, but the statute also provides that corporations may be 
licensed as brokers. The statutes do not, however, explain how 
a corporation that clearly cannot be an "applicant" for such a 
license can nevertheless become a licensee. We submit that the 
statutes discussed above can be reasonably reconciled only by 
interpreting the same to permit the licensing of a corporate 
broker only through some meaningful association with a duly 
licensed individual. 
In the event that the Court concludes that The Boyer Com-
pany was not technically a licensed broker, it must neverthe-
less be concluded that The Boyer Company is not precluded from 
recovering herein because of its substantial compliance with 
the statutory prerequisites to a broker's license. In Piatt v. 
Locke, 11 Utah 2d>273, 358 P.2d 95 (1961), this Court held that 
a contractor who had substantially, although not technically, 
complied with the applicable licensing requirements could pro-
perly recover pursuant to a construction contract. There, the 
contractor had not obtained a required specialty contractor1s 
license on the date of the subject contract, but obtained such 
license thereafter promptly upon being advised by the adminis-
oo 
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trative agency of its necessity. The Court reasoned that a 
contractor entering into a contract without knowledge of the 
specialty licensing requirements should not be precluded from 
recovering on that ground for honest services if he was not 
guilty of a failure to act diligently in obtaining the license 
after receiving notice of its necessity. 
Here, a broker's license for The Boyer Company was 
applied for and received in accordance with the long established 
practices of the Division. In Piatt, the Court indicated that 
the contractor should not be charged with requirements of which 
he had no knowledge. Likewise here, The Boyer Company should 
not be charged with requirements that diverge from the estab-
lished requirements and practices of the administering agency. 
Further, actual compliance with that agency's requirements must 
be deemed duly diligent, substantial compliance with the appli-
cable broker licensing requirements. The evident purpose of 
Section 61-2-18(a), to penalize those who fail to comply with 
broker licensing requirements, is not served by so penalizing 
those who comply with the requirements, albeit honestly erron-
eous, of the administering agency. In this instance, in any 
event, the statutory purpose of ensuring the integrity and 
ability of brokers was fulfilled, since Todd and Lignell dealt 
with only one natural person serving a broker function --
Boyer, a licensed broker. 
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POINT III 
TODD AND LIGNELL, THROUGH THEIR BAD FAITH 
REFUSAL TO COOPERATE AND CONCLUDE THE SALE, 
PREVENTED THE CONSUMMATION OF THE SALE, AND 
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR COMMISSION. 
On appeal, the findings of the lower court will not be 
disturbed unless they are clearly against the weight of the 
evidence or it clearly appears that the trial court misapplied 
the law to the established facts. Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 
Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28 (1972). A review of the record.re- . . 
veals that even given this difficult standard, two findings 
entered by the lower court are clearly against and contrary to 
the weight of the evidence and that, indeed, the clear weight 
of the evidence supports contrary findings. 
Findings of Fact numbers 6 and 17 (R.194, 196) state 
as follows: 
6. Defendants did not fail or refuse to • 
cooperate with plaintiffs toward the con-
summation of the sale or otherwise block 
the said sale or prevent H. Roger Boyer 
from performing under the terms of the 
subject listing agreement. 
17. Defendants were free to terminate 
their listing agreement with H. Roger 
Boyer at any time without liability and 
did so fairly and in good faith on the 
19th day of November, 1973. 
The lower court's Memorandum Decision contained no such findings, 
while the Findings of Fact prepared by counsel for defendants 
gratuitously included these determinations, which were adopted 
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with all other such findings by the lower court. As discussed 
in detail above, these findings, being gratutiously added by 
counsel for defendants, are not entitled to the deference that 
would otherwise attach to a finding of the lower court. How-
ever, a review of the evidence compels the conclusion that the 
clear weight of the evidence establishes that Todd and Lignell 
did in bad faith fail to cooperate towards and in fact refused 
to proceed with the proposed sale. 
In Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, Inc., 1 Utah 2d 9, 261 P.2d 
927 (1953), this Court addressed a case extraordinarily similar 
to this case. In Hoyt, the broker, Wasatch, entered into an 
an agreement with the Hoyts, who desired to sell certain realty. 
That agreement, like the Listing Agreement here, authorized the 
broker to sell such realty and prescribed that the sellers were 
to pay a commission if a sale was consummated, (1 Utah 2d at 
11, 261 P.2d at 927; Exhibit 1-P). Thereafter, the broker pro-
cured the Johnsons as prospective buyers, who like the Osmond 
Brothers, made a down payment and signed Mthe usual printed 
form Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement.11 (1 Utah 2d at 11, 
261 P.2d at 927; Exhibit 2-P) . The Earnest Money Receipt and 
Agreement did not prescribe the method by which the $19,000.00 
balance of the purchase price was to be paid and recited: 
"terms and conditions * * * subject to adjustment agreeable to 
the parties." Further, the Agreement required the sellers to 
provide certain platting of the realty and procure its 
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annexation to a city. Finally, the Hoyt Earnest Money Receipt 
and Agreement, like the Earnest Money Agreement here, pro-
vided that "the seller agrees, in consideration of the efforts 
of the * * * [broker] in procuring a purchaser, to pay the said 
* * * [broker] the rate of commission recommended by the Salt 
Lake Real Estate Board." (1 Utah 2d at 11, 261.P.2d at 927-
28). The sellers executed the Agreement as written. After 
further negotiation, the sellers and buyers did come to an oral 
agreement on the terms and time of payment of the $19,000.00 
2 
balance, but no formal or written contract was prepared. 
Thereafter, the sellers procured the annexation to the city of 
the subdivision. The sellers testified at trial that two mat-
ters remained unresolved following the parties1 oral agreement 
upon payment terms: (1) the sellers had not yet passed upon 
the acceptability of certain other property offered by the 
buyers as collateral and (2) the buyers had not yet posted a 
bond ensuring the completion of subdivision improvements as 
they had agreed to do. The buyers had unsuccessfully attempted 
to procure such a bond, but had made arrangements to obtain 
another bond. Likewise here, all that materially remained to 
2/ While not identical, the situation here is closely anal-
ogous. Whereas the offer as executed in Hoyt did not create 
an enforceable contract because of its uncertain and prelimi-
nary terms, as the Hoyt Court found, here the Earnest Money 
Agreement as modified by Todd and Lignell constituted a counter-
offer that was unexecuted but orally accepted by the Osmond 
Brothers, 
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be done to consummate the sale was the approval of Northwestern 
3 
of the Osmond Brothers1 assumption of the loan. 
Shortly following annexation, but before any final con-
tract had been submitted to the buyers, the sellers served upon 
the buyers a notice reciting that unless within five days the 
buyers paid the full purchase price, arranged for the installa-
tion of certain subdivision improvements, and posted the neces-
sary bond, the sellers would consider the agreement terminated. 
The buyers thereupon offered to proceed with the transaction em-
bodied in the Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement as modified 
by the subsequent oral agreement, but the sellers refused. At 
the time the buyers received such notice they, like the Osmond 
Brothers, were willing and able to proceed with their agree-
ment but, fTtheir offer met with a blanket rejection upon Hoyt!s 
[the seller's] part, with no suggestion of counter-offer or 
other reasonable effort to complete the transaction.11 (1 Utah 
2d at 13, 261 P.2d at 929). Here, as will be shown, Todd and 
Lignell refused to diligently seek the assumption of the North-
western loan (which "only they could arrange) , and when their 
3/ Todd testified that at this juncture, all that remained 
to be done was (1) agreement to the deletion of the lease-
back provision by the Osmond Brothers, which had already been 
agreed to as will be shown below, (2) agreement by North-
western to remove from Northwestern1s mortgage the doctors1 
dental building, which Todd indicated posed no problem, as 
discussed below, and (3) the negotiation of the assumption 
by the Osmond Brothers of the Northwestern loan. (T.157). 
_97_ 
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performance under the parties1 agreement was demanded, they 
refused to proceed with the sale. 
Based upon the foregoing facts, the Hoyt Court on two 
groimds concluded that the broker was entitled to recover, not-
withstanding that the subject sale had not been consummated. 
First, the Court held that the seller's refusal to cooperate 
and close the transaction waived the consummated sale prere-
quisite to the broker's commission under the listing agreement: 
Under such circumstances Hoyt could not by 
refusal to cooperate, defeat the defendant's 
-•ywwM«ito*wa.^u right to its .commission. And we say this^,,.^^^,..,;,,^^, 
advisedly, notwitstanding the finding of 
the trial court, that when Hoyt originally 
engaged the defendant to sell the property, 
it was agreed that the commission would be 
paid only if a sale were consummated. 
That agreement certainly contemplated 
that the plaintiff would cooperate in good 
faith toward the accomplishment of the pur-
pose for which he employed defendant. He 
cannot be permitted to procure them to ob-
tain a buyer, on terms accepted by the 
plaintiff, and then prevent the accomplish-
ment of what he requested and authorized 
them to do by arbitrarily refusing to per-
form his part of the transaction. Under 
such circumstances, he will not be heard 
to complain of their failure to do that 
which he prevents. 1 Utah 2d at 14-15, 
261 P.2d at 930. 
Second, the Court concluded that the Earnest Money Receipt and 
Agreement, which did not require a sale as a prerequisite to 
the broker's commission, entitled the broker to a commission 
because he had produced a ready, willing, and able buyer: 
-28-
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Defendant advances another proposition sup-
porting the claim to its commission: That 
the Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement, hav-
ing been executed after the listing agree-
ment, and after the Johnsons had been ac-
cepted as buyers, superseded the former agree-
ment; and that it expressly binds plaintiffs 
to pay defendant their commission. It states: 
"The seller agrees, in 
consideration of the efforts of 
the * * * [broker] in procuring 
a purchaser, to pay the said 
* * * [broker] the rate of com-
mission recommended by the Salt 
Lake Real Estate Board." 
Defendant points out that under such an agree-
ment all the broker is obligated to do is to 
- produce a ready, willing and able buyer and * 
that at plaintiff's request it exerted "ef-
forts * * * in producing a purchaser * * *" 
before, at the time of, and after the plain-
tiffs signed the Earnest Money Agreement and 
contend that it follows as an elementary pro-
position that the plaintiff, having so agreed, 
must pay. Plaintiffs, however, counter that 
the prior listing contract calling for a 
consummated sale, stands independent of the 
Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement, and is 
not necessarily inconsistent with it. In 
view of the language just quoted specifi-
cally covering the payment of commission for 
efforts of the broker in procuring a pur-
chaser (not in consummating a sale) the 
writer is of the opinion that the defendant 
is correct ±n this contention also, and that 
for this additional reason judgment in favor 
of the defendant for its commission is man-
datory. 1 Utah 2d at 15, 261 P.2d at 930-31. 
Lines 49 and 50 of the Earnest Money Agreement here contain a 
provision virtually identical to that before the Court in Hoyt 
The seller agrees in consideration of the ef-
forts of the agent in procuring a purchaser 
to pay said agent a commission of $28,500.00 
of the sales price (Exhibit 2-P). 
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Quite significantly to this appeal, the Hoyt Court reversed the 
trial court's judgment against the broker and remanded with 
directions to enter judgment against the sellers in the amount 
of the broker's commission. 
Another case quite similar to that at bar is Curtis v. 
Mortensen, 1 Utah 2d 354, 267 P.2d 237 (1954). There, the 
broker procured from the sellers a listing agreement concerning 
a motel property. Thereafter, the broker on behalf of the pros-
pective buyers executed an earnest money agreement, which was 
later executed by the sellers, upon the sellers1 terms but sub-
ject to the buyers1 approval following their examination of the 
motel abstract and operating statement. Before approval by the 
buyers, the sellers rescinded and the buyers sued for specific 
performance. In their suit for specific performance, the buyers 
failed because the buyers1 agreement was conditional and no con-
sideration had actually been paid by the buyers. 
The broker then sued the sellers for his commission. 
The sellers defended the broker's suit for his commission upon 
the ground that the broker had failed to present an offer or 
agreement that was binding on ready, willing, and able purcha-
sers. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the broker was 
entitled to his commission. The Court recognized that the bro-
ker had not procured a binding contract between buyers and sel-
lers, but reasoned that such a binding contract was unnecessary 
to the broker's recovery because (1) the buyers were prepared 
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to proceed on the sellers1 terms and did everything possible 
to indicate their willingness to proceed, and (2) the sale 
did not materialize because the sellers changed their minds and 
refused to complete the transaction. 
Under such circumstances appellants have ful-
filled their part of the listing agreement 
by having produced purchasers who were ready, 
willing and able to buy the listed property 
and are entitled to their commission. Such 
were the terms of the listing agreement made 
by the parties. There was no requirement that 
a binding contract be entered into and for us 
to add that requirement would be to make a 
new contract for them. This we may not do. 
As stated in 8 Am.Jur. Sec. 184, page 1097: 
l!0nce the broker has pro-
cured a person who is able, ready 
and willing to purchase on the terms 
offered by the owner, he is entitled 
to commissions, even though the 
failure to complete the contract is 
due to the default or refusal of the 
employer. 1 Utah 2d at 357, 267 P.2d 
at 238. 
Like the Hoyt Court, the Curtis Court reversed a judgment against 
the broker and remanded with directions to enter judgment in 
favor of the broker. 
Based upon beth Hoyt and Curtis, the law of Utah clearly 
requires only that the broker produce a ready, willing, and able 
purchaser to recover his commission pursuant to the usual 
"Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase" -- particularly 
where the seller withdraws from or fails to cooperate in consum-
mating a sale upon his terms, the broker need not produce a bind-
ing contract to convey between purchaser and seller. Thus, even 
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assuming that, as the lower court found, Todd and Lignell?s 
modification and execution of the Earnest Money Agreement con-
stituted a counteroffer and not a binding contract, The Boyer 
Company is still entitled to its commission if the Osmond Bro-
thers were ready and able to proceed with the transaction as 
reflected by the modified Earnest Money Agreement. Based upon 
the Hoyt case, if this Court concludes that Todd and Lignell 
refused to cooperate and withdrew from the transaction notwith-
standing the Osmond Brothers willingness to proceed, Boyer may 
recover pursuant to the Listing Agreement notwithstanding that 
it was conditional upon a consummation of the sale -- that con-
dition is waived by Todd and LignellTs refusal to cooperate and 
to proceed. It remains to demonstrate (1) that the Osmond 
Brothers were ready, willing, and able to proceed with the 
transaction as evidenced by the modified Earnest Money Agree-
ment and (2) that Todd and Lignell refused to cooperate to-
wards and refused to proceed with the sale. 
A. The Osmond Brothers were ready, willing, and able 
to purchase the Shaughnessy Apartments on terms prescribed by 
Todd and Lignell. The Osmond Brothers imquestionably were finan-
cially able to proceed with the purchase of the Shaughnessy Apart-
ments. Costley, the Osmond Brothers' accountant, testified that 
the Osmond Brothers possessed and had already earmarked the down 
payment (approximately $400,000.00) and had the ability to make 
the requisite mortgage payments to Northwestern even if the 
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Shaughnessy Apartments had generated no income. (T.122-23). 
Todd testified that he told MacLeod that the Osmond Brothers 
were considerably wealthier than he and Lignell. (T.48). The 
record contains no evidence casting any doubt on the Osmond 
Brothers' financial ability to proceed with the sale. 
The record is likewise clear that the Osmond Brothers 
were ready and willing, even eager, to proceed with the sale. 
Callister testified that he instructed Boyer to accept for the 
Osmond Brothers the Earnest Money Agreement as modified by 
Todd and Lignell and authorized Boyer to proceed with the clos-
ing of the transaction. Callister further testified that the 
Osmond Brothers were !fanxious to close11 and would be "delighted 
to close11 the transaction. When Boyer advised Callister that 
Todd and Lignell did not desire to proceed, Callister even gave 
thought to suing Todd and Lignell to enforce the modified Ear-
nest Money Agreement. (Callister Depo. 21-27). Costley testi-
fied that the Earnest Money Agreement, as modified by Todd and 
Lignell, was "perfectly all right," that he was not concerned 
with Todd and Lignell!s changes (T.120-31), and that "[w]e felt 
we had made a commitment on this when we signed an earnest money 
agreement, and we were not at liberty to make a commitment on 
another piece of property or sign another earnest money agree-
ment until this one had been settled." (T.146-47). The fore-
going testimony is uncontroverted. Boyer testified that he 
advised Todd after the modification of the Earnest Money 
-33-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Agreement that the Osmond Brothers had accepted the same as 
modified and were anxious to close the transaction as soon as 
possible. (T.184-85). Todd, on the other hand, testified that 
although Boyer told him that Todd and Lignell's changes to the 
Earnest Money Agreement f,could be worked out,'1 Todd never asked 
and Boyer never advised him specifically that the changes were 
acceptable to the Osmond Brothers. (T.21, 52). Todd so testi-
fied notwithstanding his inconsistent position discussed below 
that he sought to arrange an assumption of the Northwestern loan 
r— by the Osmond Brothers. (T. 26-28)'. . . ..., r~i - •;-... :,, 
The lower court made no finding as to the readiness, 
willingness, or ability of the Osmond Brothers to purchase the 
Shaughnessy Apartments on Todd and Lignell's terms, but the 
evidence clearly establishes this fact and there exists no con-
trary evidence. Although the findings state that the "counter-
offer was never accepted by the proposed buyers, The Osmond Bro-
thers, in a legally binding fashion" (Finding no.11, R.195, 
emphasis added), the evidence clearly establishes that the Os-
mond Brothers orally accepted the "counteroffer" and were will-
ing and eager to proceed with and close the transaction. 
B. Todd and Lignell refused to cooperate towards and 
refused to proceed with the sale. According to Todd, only 
three things remained to be done in order to consummate the 
sale of the Shaughnessy Apartments to the Osmond Brothers. (T. 
51-54). First, Todd maintains that he never was advised that 
-'IZL-
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the Osmond Brothers were willing to proceed with the trans-
action absent the leaseback provision that Todd and Lignell 
deleted. (T.51-52). To believe Todd on this point, this 
Court must disbelieve Callister, Costley, and Boyer, as noted 
above, must believe that a broker having the prospect of earn-
ing a $28,500.00 commission would not communicate his buyer's 
acceptance of his seller's offer, must believe that Todd in 
five or six conversations with Beyer never once asked whether 
the Osmond Brothers agreed to the leaseback deletion, even 
though Todd acknowledges that this question was very important 
to him, and finally must believe that Todd would seek to arrange 
the loan assumption with Northwestern while not knowing or 
trying to find out whether he and the Osmond Brothers had a 
deal. Todd amazingly stated in his deposition that the Os-
mond Brothers' position on the leaseback was discussed with 
Boyer only once -- on November 17, 1973, when Todd advised 
Boyer that he and Lignell would not sell the property. (Todd 
Depo. pp.41-42). Even Todd was not categorical on this point, 
acknowledging that Boyer at least told him that the leaseback 
deletion "could be worked out." We submit that the evidence 
clearly supports the fact that the Osmond Brothers did accept 
Todd and Lignell's counteroffer, and the findings below are not 
inconsistent with that conclusion. 
Second, Todd indicated that some arrangement had to 
be made with Northwestern to remove the doctors' dental 
. • • • ' ' . ' o c • 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
building from the mortgage that Northwestern held upon both 
the Shaughnessy Apartments and the adjoining dental building. 
(T. 5.4, 157). The minimal, if not nonexistent, significance of 
this problem in Todd's mind prior to trial is clear: (1) Al-
though Todd and Lignell apparently quite carefully scrutinized 
the Earnest Money Agreement, which contained no reference to 
this "problem,ff Todd and Lignell took no steps in any way to 
modify the Agreement to clarify or even point out the existence 
of the problem. (Exhibit 2-P). (2) During his deposition, 
,wTodd was asked to state the various reasons why—the- sale of .••.« *Z^-**m«***~ 
the Shaughnessy Apartments was not consummated, and he never 
once made any reference to this nproblem.M (Todd Depo. pp. 
41-45, T.54). (3) Todd did not mention to Boyer any problem 
concerning a severance of the dental building from the North-
western loan prior to the doctors' refusal to proceed with the 
transaction on November 17, 1973. (T.203-04). Most signi-
ficantly, however, Todd himself testified that this "problem" 
was really not a problem. At trial, Todd indicated on three 
separate occasions"that this problem was one that had to be 
resolved with Northwestern and that MacLeod "indicated he was 
willing to separate it [the dental building] out," that Mac 
Leod indicated that "[i]t could be worked out," and that 
Todd believed that "if the rest of the deal could be solved 
that would not be a problem that couldn't be handled." (T. 
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30-31, 42, 49-50). The second problem, therefore, was not 
a problem. 
Third, Todd indicated that MacLeod of Northwestern had 
to approve the assumption by the Osmond Brothers of North-
western's loan to Todd and Lignell. (T.52-53). The record in 
this case reveals the uncontroverted fact that had Todd re-
quested Northwestern1s approval of the Osmond Brothers' assump-
tion of the loan, approval would have been granted. MacLeod 
in his deposition testified as follows on examination by coun-
sel for defendants: 
0, I believe Mr. Rooker asked you 
the question, and 1 will ask it again: Had 
your company been asked to allow the Osmond 
Brothers to assume that existing loan at the 
rate of seven per cent interest in October 
of 1973, would you have recommended - -
A. If I had been asked to recommend 
transfer of the loan in the unchanged amount 
at an unchanged rate to the Osmond Brothers, 
would I have recommended? I would have 
recommended. 
Q. At seven per cent? 
A. At seven per cent. On a realis-
tic basis, or on a pragmatic basis, I would 
have had to have judged that my position 
was certainly not any worse than it would 
have been with Todd and Lignell. I was not 
having any increased exposure in the loan. 
It was being taken over on the reduced 
balance. 
The property had proven itself for 
several years of operation, and I was re-
ceiving a substitution of financial respon-
sibility considerably greater than what I 
would have before. 
-37-
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It would have been, it would have been 
as I indicated earlier, a recommendation with 
reluctance. And I think instead of a recom-
mendation, it probably would have been an 
acknowledgment of, you know, we are probably 
going to have to approve this. 
Q. You would not have required then 
any type of consideration coming back to 
Northwestern for the assumption by the Os-
monds? 
A. In full answer, I would have to 
say, as I indicated earlier, that an appro-
val of the thing would have been with re-
luctance. But if the request had persis-
ted, I would have, on a pragmatic basis, 
simply acknowledged that this is probably 
something that we are going to have to go on, 
Q. Do you remember, in a conversa-
tion with Dr. Todd, having Dr. Todd ask you 
that specifically, whether or not you!d al-
low them to assume it? 
A, I don't recall. I do not recall. 
Q. Then you wouldn't recall what 
your answer was? 
A. I don't recall having discussed 
it, so I don't know hoxtf the answer could 
have been presumed. (MacLeod Depo. pp.40-41). 
What follows will demonstrate that the Osmond Brothers 
were even willing,,to grant various incentives to Northwestern 
to permit their assumption, but that Todd never seriously sought 
to obtain Northwestern's approval of the Osmond Brothers' assump-
tion; rather, Todd was attempting to negotiate a refinancing of 
the Shaughnessy Apartments for himself and Lignell. The policy 
of MacLeod and Northwestern regarding negotiation of assumptions 
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was clear and unbending. MacLeod repeatedly reemphasized that 
Northwestern would neither discuss nor consider any modification 
of financing arrangements with their borrowers absent authori-
zation from their borrowers, with whom Northwestern has privity. 
(MacLeod Depo. pp.8, 10-11, 60-61, 64-65, 71). From prior deal-
ings with MacLeod, Todd had knowledge of this policy. (MacLeod 
Depo. pp.60-61). Thus, on each of the two instances when Boyer 
telephoned MacLeod, MacLeod testified that he referred Boyer to 
Todd and refused to discuss the matter with Boyer. (MacLeod 
Depo. pp.8, 38). MacLeod was firm in his recollection that Todd 
had never instructed him to deal with Boyer on this subject: 
Q. Now, in answer to Mr. Bowen's ques-
tion, you said that if there had been a re-
quest for a straight assumption by the Os-
monds that had been pressed, you thought you 
would have recommended it and that it would 
have been approved; is that right? 
A. Yes, I have said exactly that. 
If it had been persisted on a pragmatic 
basis, I probably would have simply acknow-
ledged it and recommended it, because it 
would have been a transfer of position of 
one borrower on the same loan for another. 
And the existing borrower was one whose fi-
nancial condition was coming into, at least 
to my estimate of it at the time, jeopardy, 
question, etc. 
The other borrower, the assuming party, 
was coming to me representing to be an en-
tity of financial strength. 
Q. Now, who would that request have 
had to come from? 
A. The request would have had to 
come from the borrower. 
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Q. That is, Todd, specifically? 
A. From Todd or from a party that 
Todd would have authorized us to receive 
the request from. 
Q, And did Todd ever authorize you 
to receive such a request from anyone other 
than himself? 
A. Not that I recall. And I say that 
firmly, footnoting it. 
Q. If someone had persisted in such a 
request, who would have had to have persisted? 
A. It would have had to have per-
sisted from Todd or from a party Todd had 
authorized us to receive the persistent in-
-~r-».-..: quiry from. (MacLeod Depo. pp. 64-65). - — v~ •< -. 
There exists no question, therefore, that the power to arrange 
an assumption lay solely in the hands of Todd. Todd implicitly 
recognized this fact by acknowledging that MacLeod had complained 
to him about Boyer?s calling MacLeod regarding the assumption. 
(T.75). 
The folloxtfing evidence, established through Todd and 
MacLeod, clearly indicates that Todd did not seriously seek to 
arrange an assumption of the loan by the Osmond Brothers. Todd 
admitted that he never made a concrete proposal concerning assump-
tion to MacLeod. (T.79). Indeed, Todd never even advised Mac 
Leod that he and Lignell had agreed to sell the Shaughnessy Apart-
ments to the Osmond Brothers. (T.156). MacLeod confirms this 
fact in repeatedly pointing out that on each occasion that he 
spoke with Todd generally about the assumption question, he left 
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Todd with the initiative and awaited a concrete proposal from 
Todd. (MacLeod Depo. pp..32-35). Todd admitted that even though 
Boyer specifically requested that he seek in writing the consent 
of Northwestern to assumption, and even though Todd promised to 
write MacLeod a letter to that effect, Todd never wrote such a 
letter. (T,50-51). On April 16, 1973, when Todd sought another 
unrelated modification of his and Lignell's loan relationship 
with Northwestern concerning the Shaughnessy Apartments, as one 
would expect, he did so in writing. (T.57, Exhibit 12-P). Con-
trary to Todd's testimony, MacLeod unequivocally stated that he 
did not recall Todd's having requested that the Osmond Brothers 
be permitted to assume the Northwestern loan without modifica-
tion. (MacLeod Depo. pp.32, 25, 41). During the time that Todd 
was communicating with MacLeod concerning this subject, Callister 
and Costley advised Boyer that the Osmond Brothers would be will-
ing to prepay the 1974 interest on the Northwestern loan, to in-
crease the rate of interest on a larger loan, or pay additional 
monies to Northwestern to induce the latter to allow assumption. 
(Callister Depo. p*2$). Todd testified that he recalled Boyer 
advising him of the Osmond Brothers1 willingness to prepay in- \ 
terest and increase the loan interest rate, but Todd never passed 
that on to MacLeod. (T.52-53). 
4/ Contrary to his trial testimony, Todd during his deposition 
testified that he never presented MacLeod with any proposal other 
than a pure substitution of the Osmond Brothers, because Boyer 
never gave Todd any other basis. (Todd Depo. pp.36-37). 
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The testimony of Todd, without more, conclusively es-
tablishes that he did not seriously seek Northwestern?s permis-
sion to allow the assumption. Todd's recollection of his first 
discussion with MacLeod in late October, 1973 was as follows: 
He said, "Do you really want permission?11 
And I said, "No, we really don^t. It is 
a project we like and has been very suc-
cessful." And he said, "There may be 
another way, that won't be necessary to 
do it. (T.155). 
The "another way" mentioned by MacLeod was a refinancing by 
Northwestern of the Shaughnessy Apartments. Thus, during late 
^October afid through November 15, 1973, Todd discussed with Mac-**"*4-*"-**-'*6:'; 
Leod a refinancing of the Shaughnessy Apartments by Northwestern 
-- an objective obviously inconsistent with a sale of the pro-
perty to the Osmond Brothers. (Todd Depo. pp.38-39, T.24-25, 
52-56). During this same period of time, Todd was supposedly 
seeking Northwestern1s approval of the assumption by the Osmond 
Brothers. We submit that the foregoing establishes that the 
clear weight of evidence indicates that Todd and Lignell refused 
to cooperate towards the consummation of the subject sale to the 
Osmond Brothers. 
On November 19, 1973, Todd sent to Boyer a letter stat-
ing as follows: 
As I have indicated to you over the past 
- several weeks thru telephone conversations, 
we have decided, for various reasons, not 
to sell the Shaughnessy Apartments. (Exhi-
bit 5-P, Exhibit "C" hereto). 
Todd testified at trial that in mid-November, 1973 he advised 
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Boyer that he and Lignell would not proceed with the sale be-
cause Boyer presented him with a "yes or no11 ultimatum; in 
his letter, by contrast, Todd indicated that he had advised 
Boyer for "several weeks" that he and Lignell had decided not 
to sell the property. In his deposition and at trial Todd con-
ceded that at least a "minor reason" in his decision not to sell 
the property was a potential adverse tax consequence of such 
sale amounting to $145,000.00. (Todd Depo. pp.44-45, T.160).' 
In any event, the foregoing makes clear that Todd and Lignell 
did decide not to sell the property, and the readiness, willing-
ness, and ability of the Osmond Brothers to proceed played no 
role in that decision. 
We respectfully submit that the facts of this case are 
in every respect almost identical to those presented to this 
Court in Hoyt: In both cases the sellers and the broker entered 
into listing agreements requiring a consummated sale to entitle 
the broker to a commission; in both cases the sellers and the 
broker subsequently entered into an Earnest Money Agreement not 
imposing that prerequisite; in both cases the broker produced 
a ready, willing, and able purchaser; in neither case did the 
broker produce a binding, written contract between seller and 
purchaser; in both cases the sellers refused to cooperate to-
wards and to proceed with the sale. The result that obtained 
in Hoyt should therefore obtain here -- the lower court's judg-
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ment should be reversed with instructions to enter judgment 
for the borker. 
Only one material difference exists between this case 
and Hoyt. Here, Boyer as broker entered into the Listing Agree-
ment, while The Boyer Company as broker entered into the Earnest 
Money Agreement, Should the Court conclude that a technical 
licensing defect precludes recovery by The Boyer Company under 
the Earnest Money Agreement, Boyer should recover under the 
5 
Listing Agreement. 
lT*7.r'~Z " CONCLUSION 7; ;;-
In its Memorandum Decision, the lower court concluded 
that plaintiffs could not recover because (1) Boyer failed 
to bring about a consummated sale of the property, (2) The 
Boyer Company was not a duly licensed broker, (3) the Osmond 
Brothers did not properly accept Todd and Lignellfs counter-
offer, and (4) the Earnest Money Agreement was ineffective 
because another listing agreement was in effect. 
The lower-court made no determination as to whether 
Todd and Lignell failed to cooperate towards effectuating a sale 
5/ Defendants will no doubt argue that Boyer cannot so recover 
because the lower court nfound,f that all efforts in connection 
with the Earnest Money Agreement were those of The Boyer Company. 
(Finding No,16, R.196). Aside from the fact that absolutely 
no evidence supports this "finding," Todd testified that he 
paid no attention to any difference between Boyer and The Boyer 
Company in connection with the Listing Agreement and the Earnest 
Money Agreement. (T.56). 
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other than through the findings prepared by counsel for defen-
dants. If, as we submit is clear, this Court concludes that 
defendants so failed to cooperate and refused to sell, the lower 
courtfs first and third grounds fail as a matter of law under 
Hoyt. With respect to The Boyer Company, in any event, the 
first and third grounds pose no bar, since its commission under 
the Earnest Money Agreement was conditioned neither upon a bind-
ing contract to sell nor a sale. 
The Boyer Company, as the lower court found, was 
licensed as a broker pursuant to well established practices of 
the Real Estate Division. Those practices reflect a defensible 
construction of the relevant statutes, which are reasonably cal-
culated to serve the evident statutory goals and should be up-
held by this Court. In any event, The Boyer Company should not 
be penalized for complying with the practices of the Real Es-
tate Division even if those practices are determined to diverge 
from the statutory dictates. Even if The Boyer Company was not 
duly licensed, Boyer the individual as a licensed broker should 
recover under the Lifting Agreement. 
The lower court's fourth ground bears only brief men-
tion. Defendants and Boyer, the president and sole stockholder 
of The Boyer Company, entered into the Listing Agreement. 
Defendants and The Boyer Company, both with evident knowledge 
of the prior Listing Agreement, entered into the Earnest Money 
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Agreement. From the course of events recited above, it is 
clear that the Listing Agreement contemplated a later preli-
minary contract to convey involving Boyer, Todd, and Lignell 
— The Earnest Money Agreement effectuated that intent and should 
be given effect. Defendants testified that they did not distin-
guish between the two in connection with both the Listing Agree-
ment and the Earnest Money Agreement (T.56), and for that rea-
son neither should this Court insofar as the lower court's 
fourth ground is concerned. The fourth ground in any event 
could not affect Boyerls right to recovery. The judgment of . w_ 
the lower court should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
MARTINEAU & MAAK 
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EXHIBIT "A1 
October 1, 1973 
Mr. H. Roger Boyer 
548 East South Temple St. ' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Mr. Boyer; 
This letter will authorize you to proceed with negotiations 
for the sale of the Shaughnessy Apts. at 247 South 7th East St. 
in Salt Lake City at a figure of $950,000.00, (Nine hundred fifty 
thousand dollars) with a commission of 6% (six percent) of the 
sales price due you upon completion and full payment of the 
difference betxvTeen the mortgage balance and the sales price. 
(approximately $437,541•88). 
A
 "•? The sale of this property is subject to the approval of 
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, the holder of the . 
permanent mortgage. 
Our Dental Building is involved in the mortgage withMJorth-
western Mutual Life and it must be clearly understood that it is 
not part of the deal and will be separated out and remain the 
property of Todd and Lignell. 
Sincerely, 
BMT/jt 
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1 TO: 
•THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT, IF NOT UNDERSTOOD, SEEK COMPETENT ADVICE." 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER TO PURCHASE 
The BoyiTr Company Salt Lake City
 Ut>h Oct. II 
Name of Rrok?r Company 
-19. 73 
2 IN C O N S I D E R A T I O N OF your agreement to use your effort, to present this offer to the Seller. I / w c T h e OsiTlOnd Brother, A Utah Partnership 
3 hereby deposit with you a, earnest money eh. sum of (S 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , F l V e t h o U S O n d a n d n o / 1 0 0 - p p y ^ 
4 in the form of C h e C K f—=rX7i 1 : r i i Ti 
5 to secure and apply on the purchase of the property situated at: 2 5 1 S o u t h 7 0 0 E a s t i n c l u s i v e o f p r o p e r t y W i t h C a r p O I T S O n d a l l 
6 rights of way for ingress and egress. . 
Salt Lake C i t y _ Salt Lake . C o u n t y , State o f - Utah 
11 including any of the following items if at present attached to the premises: Plumbing and heating fixtures and equipment including stoker and oil tanks, water heaters, and burners, 
12 electric light fixtures excluding bulbs, bathroom fixtures, roller shades, curtain rods and fixtures, Venetian blinds, window and door screens, linoleum, ail shrubs and trees, and any 
13 other fixtures except i N O n e j -
14 The following persona, property shall also be Included as.part of the property
 r . - * . - . . A l l e q u i p m e n t U S e d i n O p e r a t i o n O f t h e U n i t s for 
15 cleaning, maintenance or other purposes, carpets, drapes, air conditioning, all appliances. 
nt ,, 921,500.00 , Nine hundred twenty -one thousand five hundred and no/100 DOU^RS 
•3 , W w . U U which represents the aforedescribed deposit, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged by you: 
.when aeiIer.»pproves "'»• * 4 U 4 , 0 U U . U U
 o n delivery, of deed, or final contract of 
17 The tout purchase price 
18 shall be payable as follows: $. 
19 $. 
20 sale whi( d c t o B e r i r ~7T assumption of 
23 
24 
ich shall be on or W„r» w v . i w m g i m 19 ' ° . and $ each month commencing u » W ' » u | ' m i m 
J512,000.00 mortgage with Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company bearing interest at ^ 
7%. Offer made subject to ability to assume above mortgage or equivalent financing. -Ak^y X i ' T 
sf4«W ngrpas tn Uasa hadtLjxQp&fyz^mmJauYQr for period of three yeaf5=fogir$36;5Q0 per apnum ' -
•with Jew*! pnyiccpo^o.Y.raongas nnri.mnrtnnqe poymejftfcsu, 
, balance of t S e e a b o v e -together with interest \% paid; provided, however, that buyer at his option, at any time, may pay amounts in excess of the monthly 
..see_akovg, i the limitations of any mortgage or contract by the buyer herein assumed. Interest a r annum on the unpaid portions of the 28 payments upon the unpaid balance, subject tL - „ . .. . . 
29 purchase price to be included in the prescribed payments and shall begin as of date of possession which shall be on or 
W « , O c t . 1 8
 1 0 7 3 A i i n i k of !<„, a n d destruction 
30 of property, and expenses of insurance shall be born by the seller until date of possession at which time property taxes, rents, insurance, interest and other expenses of the property shall 
31 be prorated as of date of possession. AH other u s e s and all assessments, mortgages, chattel liens and and other liens, encumbrances or charges against the property of any nature shall 
32 be paid by the seller except J N P J Q J L - . _ _ _ - _ _ « _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . 
33 The following; special improvements are included in this sale: Sewer H—Connected g . Septic Tank and/or Cesspool D . Sidewalk £5, Curb and Cutter g j Special Street 
34 Paving fJJ. Special Street Lighting QJ, Culinary Water (Ci ty £^. Other Community System Q . Private Q (Legend: Yes ( x ) N o ( 0 ) . 
3 J C O N T R A C T OF SALE OR I N S T R U M E N T O P C O N V E Y A N C E T O BE M A D E O N T H E A P P R O V E D F O R M OP T H E U T A H SECURITIES C O M M I S S I O N I N T H E N A M E O P 
%A As directed 
. days from dale hereof, and unless so One 37 This payment ia received and offer is made subject to the written acceptance of the seller endorsed hereon within . 
38 approved the return of the money herein receipted shall cancel this offer withot damage to the undersigned agent. 
39 In the event the purchaser fails to pay the balance of said purchase price or complete said purchase as herein provided, the amounts paid hereon shall, at the option of the 
40 seller be retained as liquidated and agreed damages. 
41 It is understood and agreed that the terms written in this receipt constiute the entire Preliminary Conti 
42 made by anyone relative to this transaction shall be construed to be a part of this transaction unless incorporaj 
43 contract ^ a l l abrogate thiL Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase. t .shall abrogate thiL Earnest Monei 
The Boyer Company 
Her. and that no verbal statement 
r agreed that execution of the final 
Broker Company 
45 We do hereby agree to carry out and fufill the terms and conditions specified above, and the seller agrees to furnish good and marketable title with abstract brought to date or at 
46 Seller's option a policy of title insurance in the name of the purchaser and to make final conveyance by warranty deed X Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y V Y Y Y W Y V v v y v v v v v v v v ^ . 
47 In the event of sale of other than real property, seller wil l provide evidence of title or right to sell or lease, it either party fails so to do. he agrees to pay all expenses of enforcing. 
48 this agreement, or of any right arising out of the breach thereof, including a reasonable attorney's fee. $ 9 8 S O f l Hf l 
49 The seller agrees in consideration of the efforts of the agent in procuring a purchaser, to pay said agent a commission of <j/*.<J,«JV/W» \J\J er0 0 f the sale price. 
JO In the event seller has entered into a listing contract with any other agent and said contract is presently effective, this paragraph wil l be of no force^er effect. 
/ -» / . 4b^~ / Date/ 
BJO-UB.IT 2 
Cosx^ 
8*£. 
53 (State law requires brokers to furnish copies of this contract bearing all signatures to buyer and seller. Dependent upon the method used, one of the following forms must be completed.) 
J A
 R E C E I P T 
I acknowledge receipt of iJipM copy glj&e foregoing agreement"'bearing all signat 
s<^ IS .,/.• / " /y / 
54  *Jijw f ite re ment"* 
.. ~^<Lc.al> a y , / / / 
^ j Seller / sf ' U " 
Purchaser I oeuer / ^ ,\ ,uate / rurcnaser 
1
 / •* / ' ' ' • ' Ji 
I personally / c a u s e d a final copy of ,the foregoing agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed to the Q Seller, 2\ Purchaser. 
.. by registered mail and return receipt is attached hereto. 
Date 
\ is »-*- /**•«£• &*/**- d&MP/HU *J\-4 
OVEl APPR D FORM — UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION 
FORM 123—EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND AGREEMENT IN QUAD.—KELLY CO., 53 W. NINTH SOUTH. S.L.C.. UTAH 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
November 19, 1973 
Mr. H. Roger Boyer 
548 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Dear Roger: 
As I have indicated to you over the past several 
weeks thru telephone conversations, we have decided, 
for various reasons, not to sell the Shaughnessy apart-
ments. 
We appreciate your interest and regret that cir-
cumstances dictate a negative decision at this time. 
Sincerely, 
Todd 
BMT/jt 
PLAINTIFFS 
EXHIBIT 
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